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Remus Infractus

In *Academica Priora* 2.19 Cicero represents Lucullus as saying: *Nec vero hoc loco exspectandum est, dum de remo inflexo aut de collo columbae respondeam; non enim is sum, qui quidquid videtur tale dicam esse quale videatur*. After the speech of Lucullus Cicero in his answer says (2.79): *Tu autem te negas infracto remo neque columbae collo commoveri. Primum cur? Nam et in remo sentio non esse id quod videatur, et in columba pluris videri colores nec esse plus uno*.

From the manner in which the reference is made it appears that the oar which seems to be broken and the dove's neck that seems to change colors are stock examples generally adduced in discussions on the apparent deception of the senses. That this is so is clear from a passage in which Sextus Empiricus enumerates a number of cases in which the senses seem to be deceived. The pertinent words are: *καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ κώπη ἑναλός μὲν κεκλασμένη ἑξαλός δὲ εὐθεία*¹ and *καὶ οἱ τράχηλοι δὲ τῶν περιστερῶν παρὰ τὰς διαφορὰς ἐπικλίσεις διάφοροι φαίνονται κατὰ χρῶμα*.²

Frequency of the Examples

To show how common these examples were, Reid in his commentary on the *Academica*³ refers the reader to passages in Sextus Empiricus, Diogenes Laertius, Lucretius, Seneca, and Petronius.

Again in *De Divinatione* (2.120) Cicero proposes two more examples of a similar sort of apparent deception in sense knowledge: *Nam et navigantibus moveri videntur ea quae stant, et quodam obtutu oculorum duo pro uno lucernae lumina*. These two examples, which are also mentioned in the *Academica*,⁴ are likewise taken from a common stock. This fact is illustrated by Arthur Stanley Pease in his edition of the *De Divinatione*,⁵ where he quotes parallel passages: for the ship, Lucretius, Seneca, and Sextus Empiricus; for the lamp, Aristotle, Lucretius, and Sextus Empiricus.

In Christian Writers

But these examples are also frequently alluded to in the early Christian writers, a fact apparently overlooked by the commentators.⁶ Tertullian in his treatise on the soul introduces the question of sense perception as follows:

Contingit nos illorum etiam quinque sensuum quaestio, quos in primis litteris discimus, quoniam et hinc aliquid haereticis procuratur. Visus est et auditus et odoratus et gustus et tactus. Horum fidem Academici durius damnant,

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secundum quosdam et Heraclitus et Diocles et Empedocles, certe Plato in *Timaeo* irrationalem pronuntians sensualitatem et opinioni coimplicitam. Itaque mendacium visui obicitur, quod remos in aqua inflexos vel infractos adseverat adversus conscientiam integritatis, quod turrem quadrangulatam de longinquo rotundam persuadeat, quod aequalissimam porticum angustiore in ultimo infamet, quod caelum tanta sublimitate suspensum mari iungat. Perinde auditus fallaciae reus, ut cum caeleste murmur putamus et plaustrum est, vel tonitru mediante pro certo de plastro credimus sonitum. Sic et odoratus et gustus arguuntur, siquidem eadem unguenta eademque vina posteriore quoque usu depretiantur. Sic et tactus reprehenditur, siquidem eadem pavimenta manibus asperiora, pedibus leviora creduntur, et in lavacris idem calidae lacus ferventissimus primo, dehinc temperatissimus renuntiatur.⁷

Saint Jerome in his work *Contra Iohannem Hierosolymitanum*⁸ enumerates four well-known examples of optical illusion: *Scilicet nunc mihi philosophandum est, incertos esse sensus nostros, et maxime visum. Carneades aliquis ab inferis excitandus, ut proferat verum. Remum in aqua fractum videri, porticus longius angustiores, rotundos procul turrium angulos, columbarum colla colorem mutantia*.

Occurrences in Saint Augustine

Saint Augustine first treated the subject of these apparent sense deceptions in his early work against

the doctrine of the Academy⁹ and incidentally proposed the correct solution to the problem:

Ergone verum est quod de remo in aqua vident? Prorsus verum. Nam causa accedente quare ita videretur, si demersus unda remus rectus appareret, magis oculos meos falsae renuntiationis arguerem. Non enim viderent quod talibus existentibus causis videndum fuit. Quid multis opus est? Hoc de turrium motu, hoc de pinnulis avium, hoc de caeteris innumerabilibus dici potest.

In this passage the phrase, *de turrium motu*, refers to the illusion experienced by people on a moving ship, as is clear from the following passage in *De Trinitate*: . . . *nec in eis visis hoc habetur, quae obiciuntur extrinsecus, ut in eo sic fallatur oculus, quemadmodum fallitur cum in aqua remus videtur infractus, et navigantibus turres moveri, et alia sexcenta quae aliter sunt quam videntur.* . . .¹⁰

But Augustine considers the problem more at length in the twelfth book of *De Genesi ad Litteram*, where he sets down some familiar examples along with others that are apparently his own:

"Fallitur ergo [anima] in visione corporali, cum in ipsis corporibus fieri putat quod fit in corporis sensibus: sicut navigantibus videntur in terra moveri quae stant, et intuentibus caelum stare sidera quae moventur, et divaricatis radiis oculorum duas lucernae species apparere, et in aqua remus infractus, et multa huiusmodi: aut cum putat hoc esse, quod similiter coloratum est, vel similiter sonat, vel olet, vel sapit, vel tangitur; hinc enim et medicamentum aliquod ceratum coctum in cacabo putatur legumen, et sonitus trans-euntis vehiculi putatur ex tonitru, et si nullis aliis sensibus exploretur, sed soli adiaceat olfactui, citrium putatur herba quae vocatur apiaria, et cibus aliquo dulciculo succo affectus putatur melle conditus; et ignotus annulus contrectatus in tenebris, putatur aureus, cum sit aereus aut argenteus. . . ."¹¹

Use of New Examples

This last passage from Augustine and the one from Tertullian above show that these writers could invent new examples as well as quote old ones. The "bent oar" is used by both, and it is employed by almost every writer who ever considered the subject. The example of thunder may have been original with Tertullian; no earlier parallels are cited. It is possible that Augustine borrowed it from Tertullian, for he would probably have read Tertullian's *De Anima* when he was writing the twelfth book of *De Genesi ad Litteram*. Of the other examples, Tertullian would probably have taken the one of the tower from Lucretius (4.353-363) and that of the colonnade from Lucretius (4.426-431) or Seneca (*QNat.* 1.3.9). The other four examples in Tertullian seem to be original, although some rather similar passages are cited from Sextus Empiricus.¹²

Augustine's examples of the ship and the lamp must have been suggested by Cicero (*Div.* 2. 120), although the examples are also in Lucretius (4.387-390, 447-450). For the instance of the stars, the only parallel that I can find is in Lucretius (4.391-394). The rest all seem to be Augustine's own observations. This is not surprising, as Augustine is unique among the ancient authors for his interest

in psychological problems and for his ability to observe and record psychological phenomena.

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NOTES

1 *Sext. Emp. Pyr.* 1.119. 2 *Ibid.* 120. 3 James S. Reid, *M. Tulli Ciceronis Academica* (London 1885) 269. The passages cited are: *Sext. Emp. Pyr.* 1.119 and *Math.* 7.244 and 414; *Diog. Laert.* 9.85-86; *Lucr.* 2.795-805; 4.436-442; *Sen. QNat.* 1.3.9, 5.6, 7.2; *Petron. Frag.* 29 (Bücheler). 4 *Cic. Acad.* 2.81: *Videsne navem illam? Stare nobis videtur, at eis, qui in navi sunt, moveri haec villa. Ibid.* 2.80: *Itaque Timagoras Epicureus negat sibi unquam, cum oculum torsisset, duas ex lucerna flammulas esse visas.* 5 Arthur Stanley Pease, *M. Tulli Ciceronis De Divinatione Liber Secundus*, Part II (University of Illinois Studies in Language and Literature, 8.3, 1923) 544-545. The passages cited for the ship (besides *Cic. Acad.*) are: *Lucr.* 4.385-388; *Sen. QNat.* 7.25.7; *Sext. Emp. Pyr.* 1.107 and *Math.* 7.414. For the lamp Pease cites (besides Cicero): *Arist. De Insom.* 3, p. 461b31-462a5; *Eth. Eud.* 7.13, p. 1246a28-29; *Pr.* 3.30, 31.17; *Lucr.* 4.447-452; *Sext. Emp. Math.* 7.192. 6 However Cyril Bailey, *Titi Lucreti Cari De Rerum Natura Libri Sex* (Oxford 1947) 3, 1225, commenting on Lucretius 4.353, quotes *Tert. De Anim.* 17. 7 *Tert. De Anim.* 17 (edited by J. H. Waszink, Amsterdam 1947). Waszink's commentary on this passage gives an abundance of parallels from ancient authors both pagan and Christian. 8 *Hieron. Cont. Ioan. Hieros.* 35 (Migne, *PL* 23.388). 9 *August. Cont. Acad.* 3.11.26 (Migne, *PL* 32.947). 10 *August. De Trin.* (Migne, *PL* 42.1073-1074). 11 *August. De Gen. ad Lit.* 12.25.52 (Migne, *PL* 34.475). I have dropped one word from the text as it appears in Migne. In this edition we read: *aut cum putat aliquid hoc esse*: but the word *aliquid* should be dropped. See Zycha's text and apparatus in *CSEL* 28, section 3, part 1, p. 412, line 1. But Zycha's text is not without blemish here: on p. 417, line 29, for *duae lucernae species adparere*, read *duas* etc. 12 See Waszink, *op. cit.* (*supra*, note 7) 243.

Fluctuat nec Mergitur

There is a certain melancholy interest in looking over some of our grounds of dissatisfaction in relation to the teaching of the classics.

Graduate professor of English Albert Marckwardt of Michigan fears that we are headed toward "a parochial and monolingual culture," and that Latin may be in no distant day "the exclusive property of a dwindling rearguard of specialists." Many graduate professors of the Romance and Germanic languages quite fervently admit the dependence of our western modern tongues upon the classics, but in effect, since they neglect to act, or say anything publicly upon the matter, throw up their hands in surrender to the general spirit of the times, instead of showing their teeth to an educational system that they know is filching away the good name of all the languages and literatures. A professor of English in the University of Louisiana agrees that there is crying need of Latin everywhere in the secondary schools, but adds: "We all know that high schools went out of business as educational institutions 25 or 30 years ago. Students sail through Latin courses there as they do through all others, with passing grades for demonstrated ignorance."

Then come uncompromising allegations that classicists have been their own undoing. Classics

professors, it seems, were nearly all mossbacks, unconscious of the needs and interests of young people, feeding them grammar when they asked for ideas, intellectual communion, and the other glories of literature. Some of the English professors seem actually glad that disaster fell upon the classics, for they publicly assert that by the misfortunes of these they themselves are providentially forewarned and forearmed. *They* will not make the same mistakes. *They* will keep their charges in a delightfully exalted state by visions of life through a literature all but denatured as far as pure language is involved.

Thus the natural allies of the classics fail to stand by the classics' side. But more disturbing, if less dangerous, even than this aspect of the matter, is that some classicists are willing to proclaim as sinners their own brethren of a former time. One of these writes: "I think that the charge against Latin that it has killed itself is somewhat justified," and adds: "The teaching of a foreign language does present to me the insoluble problem of whether to emphasize the cultural at the expense of drill in language to insure a sound foundation for progress, or to make the course dull through routine drill which kills interest for mature students." As if literature and language, completely intertwined and interdependent as they are, cannot both be made coincidentally and reciprocally palatable!

This professor is undoubtedly typical of many who have retired intimidated and all but defeated to the sanctuary of their libraries. Listen to him further: "I would agree that knowledge of English grammar is no major argument for the study of Latin or any other foreign language." He adds that as far as it is an argument that a foreign language can help English grammar a modern Romance language would do just as well. This is a dangerous and utterly false assumption, as it would be easy to prove, and besides has no bearing on Latin's altogether unique values in this respect.

My correspondent remarks finally that with sufficient inspirational qualities on the part of the teacher the gap between the student's innate propensity toward the discussion of "ideas" and his automatic distaste for close attention to grammar and semantics may be narrowed!

Latin and the Administrators

For more discouragement to those who work for the classics must be mentioned also, not only the school and college administrators who know no word of Latin or Greek, but also the officials whose personal contacts with Latin or Greek were unhappy. The call to bend their necks to details that did not appear to these in their greener days significant, or to lend prospects for early material success, bored their spirits. Looking back it seems to them that they would have done better following only pure

English lines of less resistance. And now this thought has petrified in their minds. They repose a childlike faith in all the activities of the English departments, expand these beyond measure, and consign Latin to the limbo of forgotten shades.

There are indeed many factors working against a positive revival of Latin prestige, and we need strength to maintain our courage and good humor under the circumstances. But the dismal term of "lost cause" is not in order.

English as Latin's Ally

Lost causes in education are the helter-skelter exposure to the things of today and tomorrow only, the establishment of bathrooms and motorcars as the chief elements of national superiority, the outlook upon modern-foreign-language study as little but a "parly-voo" exercise, adoration of *The Reader's Digest* as the guide and regulator of literature in the schools, the idea that the social studies, adapted primarily to maturity, ideally serve the country's intellectually virgin youth, the conception that discipline should be bypassed, and that the brain is best developed at football games and the corner drug store. Such "causes" are lost even before any battle is joined. But Latin's future, though not in this day radiant, is not desperate. In the long run Latin is truly invincible—as all those who use their intelligence in promotion of the English language know especially well. We may descend here in the United States all the way to what some one has called a "radio and soda-pop culture." But the leaven of those who work steadily for the stability and integrity of the English language cannot possibly vanish from the earth.

Not long ago it was suggested by a committee of classicists that the profession would display better public tactics if it did not air so frankly its discomforts. I do not agree. Let defenders of English, to mention only one school group that should feel deep concern, see abundantly what is happening to Latin in the schools, as well as to some other non-expendable disciplines. Then, if English itself is not too far degraded to realize that its health depends largely on the well-being of Latin, it, the one language authority that still has power to influence educational officialdom, may at last assert itself, in its own defence, and with the necessary vigor, in Latin's behalf.

In any event, though waves of disregard may toss the good Latin ship hither and yon, it is not going under. Like the indomitable spirit set forth in the motto of the grand old capital of France, so often beset by hostile intellectual and physical forces from within and without, *fluctuat nec mergitur*.

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Aristotle on First Principles in Ethics

In these days of much discussion about juvenile delinquency, it is altogether in place to discuss the origin of first principles in ethics. How does the child acquire the first principles of his moral actions? Aristotle is perhaps the first to consider the question.

Before giving his views on the origin of the first principles, Aristotle repeats an idea he had stated earlier by saying again that we must not look for mathematical exactness in ethics.

We must not look for equal exactness in all departments of study, but only such as belongs to the subject of each and in such a degree as is appropriate to the particular line of enquiry. A carpenter and geometrician both try to find a right angle but in different ways; the former is content with that approximation to it which satisfies the purpose of his work; the latter, being a student of truth, seeks to find its essence or essential attributes. (*Eth. Nic.* 1098a27-32).¹

Next he adds an all-important comment on first principles:

Nor again must we in all matters alike demand an explanation of the reason *why* things are what they are; in some cases it is enough if the *fact* that they are so is satisfactorily established. *This is the case with first principles*: and the fact is the primary thing—it is the first principle. And different principles are learnt in different ways—some by induction (*ἐπαγωγή*), some by intuition (*αἴσθησις*), others again by some form of habituation (*ἔθισμός*); so we must endeavor to arrive at the principles of each kind in their natural manner, and must also be careful to define them correctly (*Eth. Nic.* 1098b1-6).

Learning of First Principles

Our first principles, then, according to Aristotle, cannot be proved; they cannot be demonstrated. They are learned in several different ways. They are not learned by deduction (*συλλογισμός*), because this itself begins with first principles. The way we learn first principles is by induction (*ἐπαγωγή*), by intuition (*αἴσθησις*), and by habituation (*ἔθισμός*).

There has been a good bit of discussion about these several ways of reaching first principles. It is clear enough what is meant by *ἐπαγωγή*: it is a process of induction which works to first principles or universals; *ἐπαγωγή* comes first, giving us the first principles; *συλλογισμός* works away from these first principles. This is explained elsewhere (*An. Post.* 2.19).

The other ways of getting first principles are intuition (*αἴσθησις*) and habituation (*ἔθισμός*). In treating of *νοῦς* in the sixth book, Aristotle says: *λείπεται νοῦν εἶναι τῶν ἀρχῶν* (*Nic. Eth.* 1141a8). This statement has led Burnet to identify *αἴσθησις*, as expressed here, with *νοῦς* as the perception or intuition of first principles; his interpretation is, I think, logical. It is to be admitted, however, that others identify *αἴσθησις* with experience (*ἐμπειρία*).

The final way of getting first principles is *ἔθισμός*. This is one of the few passages where Aristotle speaks of this manner of acquiring first principles.

Perhaps *ἔθισμός* is peculiar to politics and ethics. At first sight it seems strange that a *τέχνη* should depend for its first principles on *ἔθισμός*; it would seem to lead to relativism, since the *ἔθισμός* or habituation instilled by parents and teachers will differ a good bit from age to age and from country to country. This might be the case if we held that *ἔθισμός* gives us definite and particular applications of first principles; but Aristotle teaches that we get the *first* principles of ethics and politics in this fashion, nothing more. The human race as a whole agrees on the most fundamental principles or *ἀρχαί* of human actions.

We might say that these three ways of getting first principles show a certain progress, or rather regression, in point of clearness and application.

Physical Sciences and Induction

In mathematics the first principles are apprehended by *αἴσθησις* or intuition. This is the clearest, the most direct. The definition of a triangle is reached simply by looking at a triangle. No one can prove to us that a figure with three angles will also have three sides; we must simply see it for ourselves. If we cannot imagine a triangle, no one can help us to do so. When, however, we have once got the definition, we can go on to demonstrate mediate propositions about triangles to any extent by finding middle terms which lead to new conclusions.

In most cases, however, the subject is more complex, and a single act of intuition does not suffice to make the definition clear to us. This is seen in the physical sciences. Here we must use induction (*ἐπαγωγή*); by which we come to recognize the truth of the immediate proposition by being called upon to recognize it in a number of instances adduced for the purpose. It is not a proof in the strict sense that a syllogism is a proof, because the propositions which we arrive at by its help are not capable of syllogistic proof. It is simply a way of making us see for ourselves what we cannot know in any other way. If we have not the perception required to see the truth of an immediate proposition for ourselves, no number of instances will make us sure of it; if we have the perception or intuition, we shall come to see it.

But there are still more complicated cases, and these include the greater part of human affairs, which require something more than this inductive process, which is chiefly helpful in the natural sciences, dealing as they do with operations that follow set laws. Human action, on the other hand, is quite unpredictable, coming as it does from the capacity of opposites and implying a choice between alternatives.

If we are to see for ourselves the first principles of which all human action ought to be the applica-

tion, we must be habituated in such a way as always to choose the *right* alternative. If we are habituated in such a way as always to choose the *wrong* alternative, we would arrive at some sort of first principle, but it would be a false one; while if we were to choose now the one and now the other, our moral sense would be blunted and confused.

Approach to Ethical First Principles

We can learn much from the experience of others; hence Aristotle tells us to attend even to the *unproved* statements and beliefs of older and more experienced people (*Eth. Nic.* 1143b11). But in the long run, we have to perceive the first principles for ourselves. These first principles of human conduct are as incapable of demonstration as those of any other science. They cannot be proved, and at the same time they need no proof. If we are not able in the end to perceive them for ourselves, no one can make us perceive them.

To get Aristotle's full doctrine on *ἔθισμός* we have to turn to the *Ethica Eudemia* (1120a39):

That moral virtue is concerned with the pleasant and the painful is clear. But since the character, being as its name indicates something that grows by habit—and that which is *under guidance other than innate* is trained to a habit by frequent movement of a particular kind—is the active principle present after this process; but in things inanimate we do not see this (for even if you throw a stone upwards ten thousand times, it will never go upward except by compulsion), consider, then, character to be this, namely, a quality in accordance with governing reason belonging to the irrational part of the soul which is yet able to obey the reason.

To put this in everyday language, we can say simply: that is habituated which from often being moved in a certain way, under guidance which is not innate, is now prone to move that way.

The Importance of 'Εθισμός

This doctrine of *ἔθισμός* is one of the utmost importance in the education and training of the future citizen. Man is unlike natural objects in that he can be trained; a stone cannot be trained to rise of its own accord; fire cannot be trained to burn downwards. It is only man that can be trained and that can develop *moral* habits in the strict sense; habits which are *second-nature*.

Virtues are engendered in us neither by nature nor yet in violation of nature; nature gives us the capacity of receiving them and this capacity is brought to maturity by habit.

Our faculties, such as seeing and hearing, are not acquired by seeing or listening repeatedly, but the other way about,—because we have senses we begin to use them; we do not acquire them by using them. Virtues, on the other hand, we acquire by first having actually practiced them, just as we do the arts. We learn an art by doing; similarly we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts. These acts in the beginning are not virtuous,—that is, when a

child who is too young to know what is going on, who is too young to have moral sense, performs such an act, it is not really virtuous. But by repeating these acts before he has acquired a moral responsibility, he is accustomed, he is habituated, to performing actions which he will soon recognize as correct.

It is difficult thus to overemphasize the importance of training the young; this truth is attested by the experience of states: lawgivers make the citizens good by training them in habits of right action,—this is the aim of all legislation and, if it fails to do this, it is a failure; this is what distinguishes a good form of constitution from a bad one.

What We Learn by Habituation

That guidance is necessary if we are to form good habits is the basic principle of education. Teachers are needed. This is apparent when we realize that fundamentally it is by taking part in the same transactions that some men become just and others unjust; by acting in the same dangerous situations and forming a habit of fear or of confidence some men become courageous and others become cowardly. And the same holds good of our dispositions with regard to the appetites and anger; some men become temperate and gentle, others profligate and irascible, by actually comporting themselves in one way or the other in relation to those passions. In brief, our moral dispositions are formed as a result of the corresponding activities. Hence it is necessary for us to control the character of our activities, since the quality of these will decide the quality of our dispositions. It is therefore most important that we be trained from childhood in one set of habits or another.

If we ask what the *ἀρχαί* are that we obtain by *ἔθισμός*, the answer is twofold: (1) moral habits or tendencies, and (2) a point of view or opinion on moral matters.

1. Our habits are produced by the repetition of particular acts, just as scientific generalizations result from repeated perceptions. After many observations we acquire a certain point of view which dominates our scientific procedure in the department to which the observations belong. After performing many similar acts we acquire a bent which disposes us to go on performing the acts in question.

2. Further, as belief goes with action, a tendency to act in a particular way is attended by a belief that it is good (right) to act in this particular way. Hence *ἔθισμός* not only produces the *ἀρχή* of habit or tendency to act in a particular way, but also, as a kind of *ἐπαγωγή*, produces a point of view from which conduct is regarded, the *ἀρχή* of belief or opinion on moral matters.

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E D I T O R I A L

Antiquity — and World Politics

After an experience of some years in the Chicago area, the *World Politics Program* is now being attempted on a national basis. In Saint Louis, for example, it is to be initiated in 1952, under the auspices of the Saint Louis Council on World Affairs and the Adult Education Council of Greater Saint Louis. The announced procedure, set forth in a four-page pamphlet, will be essentially that of adult discussion groups following the pattern of the now widely established *Great Books* assemblies.

Groups of thirty-five or fewer persons, each with two "leaders," are expected to gather each week for twelve sessions, taking up, after an "introductory discussion," topics ranging from "What Causes War?" in meetings two and three, to "Foreign Policy: What Is the National Interest?" in meeting twelve. A wide range of selected readings, each set geared to the needs of the week's discussion, is to provide the basis of exploration. There is no pretense, the pamphlet emphasizes, at offering final solutions, and "no blueprint for a new world society is presented." But the program "does aim at discovering basic problems of world politics, through informed, relevant, and rational conversation." Further, it is understood that the "leaders" of groups will never teach or lecture or pronounce, but will merely act as catalysts in provoking discussion and keeping discussion orderly.

Naturally enough, perhaps, the readings for the program are largely modern. But the classicist will observe with interest that the one ancient work occurring is among the readings for meeting five, which is to deal with "The State and the Individual." Along with *The Declaration of Independence*, selections from Mussolini's *Fascism*, selections from Locke's *Of Civil Government*, and extracts from the

Proceedings of United Nations Commission on Human Rights, is Plato's *Crito*.

Surely the choice is an admirable one. For it would be difficult to find anywhere a dialogue in which the speaker takes a more exalted view of the relation between state and individual, of the mutual benefits of the two, their mutual rights, their mutual obligations. The Platonic Socrates, of course, speaks as he might be expected to speak, in a classical world so completely state-orientated that it can conceive nothing earthly more sacred and more noble than the state itself. Centuries ago men came to see the fundamental error of such emphasis. But our own twentieth century, at this midpoint of its years, might well brace the limp and flagging muscles of its own civic consciousness from the exaggerated sense of awe and reverence before the state that Socrates in the *Crito* displays.

No true humanist pretends to find in classical antiquity and its surviving documents the full answer to his own life, or to the increasingly complex and intricate machinery and philosophy of national government today, or to the besetting challenges of international situations. But every true humanist understands that it is deeply erroneous to look for the answers solely in the thinking of today. It is inefficient as well—and inefficiency is a capital offense to the modern mind!

With no regard to lands beyond the Pillars of Hercules, preoccupied only with the Mediterranean world and frequently with but a small portion of that domain, Greek political thinkers were yet concerned with problems essentially the same as ours. War and peace, domination, isolationism, world government, international law, rival political systems in neighboring states—all these the Greeks, as well as the Romans after them, experienced and examined. Thucydides dealt cogently with the struggle of democratic but imperialistic Athens against totalitarian and likewise imperialistic Sparta. The conquests of Alexander forced attention upon the morals of world conquest. Stoic thinkers, in Greece and especially in Rome, saw and grappled with the concept of international law.

To disregard these pronouncements of intelligent human thinking, to fail to garner the good that is in them, to ignore the chance of avoiding errors that are old in human experience and thinking—this is to squander a precious heritage, to repeat unnecessarily what has already been done. One of the signal services of the *Great Books* movement, and, in a smaller way, of the *World Politics Program*, is in their giving a practical instance of this worthy lesson.

Wer fremde Sprachen nickt kennt, weiss nichts von seiner eigenen.—Goethe.

A Sonnet Sequence, II

Aeschylus

Down-crouched in Attic moonlight near the sea
 That looks up at the Parthenon and smiles,
 A hoplite rests his shield upon his knee
 And thinks of Xerxes and the Persians' wiles.
 On Salamis' spare shores are traced that night
 The bare and haunting lines that etched in gloom
 Atossa's grief at Xerxes' headlong flight,
 And Hybris' constant soul-mate, vengeful Doom.
 The shrill stab of the clarion dispels
 These tragic thoughts and scatters on the bay
 Half-written lines and new poetic spells,
 As Aeschylus goes forth to make his play,
 To put into the action what it lacked,
 To clear the stage and close the final act.

Sophocles

The visions of that other world have fled
 The crassness of a cold and newer race.
 Her marbles crumble and her great are dead;
 A few bereaved mourners seek to trace
 The outline of the tomb where Beauty lies.
 And like the dead who flee into the haze,
 She left to us her portraits where, with eyes
 Accustomed to the dazzling light, we gaze
 Upon her, robed in glory, at the gate
 Of Thebes' royal palace, confident, self-made—
 Or weeping for a slaughtered brother's fate—
 Or sitting at Colonus in the shade.

What modern has such visions in his head,
 With both the model and the artist dead?

Euripides

A prophet has no honor till he's dead,
 And playwrights oft do languish through the years,
 Until the heart can overwhelm the head,
 And novelty can calm tradition's fears.
 They feared this man who clambered through the
 chinks
 And crevices of thought, who there proposed
 The hidden depths of what man really thinks,
 And there, before their stubborn eyes, disclosed
 The heart and soul, and stripped the conscience bare.
 But now they sleep their Sophoclean sleep,
 And shudder when they dream of kings who wear
 Torn tatters, and of hero types that weep.

But on the stage Euripides is lord,
 And Aeschylus the bleary-eyed scholar's hoard.
 Saint Louis University

Francis E. Peters, S.J.

We may say that in Homer we have the poetry of
 the Outer Life, in the Lyric poets that of the Inner
 Life of emotion and thought, in the Drama a com-
 bination of the two, where action is seen in its re-
 lation to inward motive and character.—*W. R. Hardie.*

(Continued from page 29)

Pleasure and Pain

At the bottom of this doctrine of *ἡδονή* is Aristotle's view of pleasure and pain. The moral virtues belong to the non-rational part of the soul, but the part that is under control of the rational. That is to say, the moral virtues are not virtues of the intellect, but virtues of the will and passions. The sentient soul has a natural capacity of being moved by the imagination of pleasure and pain. These imaginations are constantly being presented to it since every act of sensation is accompanied by pleasure or pain and the images of these feelings are stored up in the memory. But the capacity of the soul to feel pleasure and pain is a rational capacity which may become active in two opposite ways. It may take pleasure in a good act or it may take pleasure in a bad act. Left to itself the capacity will remain dormant unless something determines it in one direction or the other. That which moves it is appetite, which converts the mere capacity of pleasure and pain into a desire to have the pleasure and avoid the pain.

In general the part played by pleasure and pain in habituation (*ἡθισμός*) is twofold. Pleasure and pain are used to habituate the child to perform good actions: pleasure as an encouragement, pain as a deterrent. And again as the performance of certain acts is attended by pleasure or pain, we may infer that the habit of performing them has or has not been acquired. Thus he who faces danger and feels pleasure, or at least no pain, in so doing, is habitually courageous; while he who feels pain in so doing is cowardly.

We can go so far as to describe the field of moral virtue as the field of "pleasures and pains." It is, first of all, pleasure and pain which are responsible for our doing base actions and abstaining from noble actions. That is why education is so important: people must be *trained* from childhood to like and dislike the proper things. It is this which constitutes good education. Again, since the virtues have to do with actions and feelings, and every feeling and every action is attended with pleasure or pain, this too shows that virtue is concerned with pleasure and pain. Last of all, another indication is the fact that pain is the medium of punishment, and pleasure is the medium of encouragement to virtue. We are all susceptible to pleasure and pain from the cradle; any fond parent knows that. We might say that pleasure and pain are ingrained in the fabric of our lives; we instinctively desire the pleasant and instinctively turn away from the painful.

Habituation and Tradition

Does habituation mean that our moral principles are dependent wholly on tradition? In the field of

mathematics, the question how a child comes in the first instance to believe that two sides of a triangle are greater than a third, has nothing to do with the question, Why does a mathematician accept it, or why should he accept it? Thus a consideration of the question, How do children generally come by their moral beliefs? is not the same as, What is the right ground for our moral beliefs? A child may accept mathematical truths on the word of his teacher, and yet no one would on that account say that mathematics rests on tradition for its first principles. So too in the field of morals. Once we recognize the principles of ethics, we see that these principles have their own validity. Ethics does not rest on tradition.

The difficulty remains, however, that the beliefs of children seem to depend wholly on tradition, that is, on the teaching of parents and masters, on habituation (*ἐθισμός*). Long before they are able to reason or express their thoughts with any clearness, children have already been instructed in moral truths: they have accepted these truths on the ground of tradition only.

Despite this fact, it is clear that the beliefs of children do not depend wholly on tradition. Though the child begins with tradition, yet at the age of ten, say, or earlier, he has already come into possession of certain moral beliefs which he holds with a strong intellectual conviction, not on the strength of mere human testimony, but on account of their own intrinsic evidence. At this age he no longer requires the authority of his parents in the case of at least some moral principles; he adheres to these principles on account of the insight he now possesses into the intrinsic truth of these propositions.

The moral world, therefore, has begun to appeal to such a child for its own sake, and he will judge of it from what he feels and perceives, and will talk of it as a thing that he is familiar with, and will think for himself concerning the reasonableness of the moral laws, and will even question the judgment of other people about them. This shows that some at least of his judgments on moral matters are now received at first hand, and not on mere authority.

Some of the child's remote conclusions may be wrong. But, in general, on broad moral principles, his judgment is perfectly trustworthy. No boy, for instance, could think that murder, lying, cruelty, and robbery are right things, and should be done.

These general principles through the work of habituation (*ἐθισμός*) are his forever.

Oxford, England Hillard Leon Brozowski, S.J.

NOTE

1 Translations are by H. Rackham, in the Loeb Classical Library.

Crudelis lacrimis pascitur non frangitur.—Publius Syrus, *Sententiae* 128.

Breviora

Plutarch and Oscar Hammerstein II

In all probability Oscar Hammerstein II was not under the influence of Plutarch when he wrote the words of "Ol' Man River." By an odd coincidence, however, one sentence in the song is almost identical with a sentence employed by Plutarch in *Mulierum Virtutes* (263B). In the final section of this work Plutarch, in discussing the unhappy lot of Pythes, relates (263A-C) that Xerxes, while on his way to invade Greece, was lavishly entertained by Pythes, who asked in turn only that one of his sons be excused from military service and be allowed to remain behind with him to help him in his old age. Xerxes was so angered by this request, however, that he ordered the youth to be killed and bisected, and marched his entire army between the two halves of the lifeless body. The remaining sons of Pythes were taken along on the expedition and later died in the war (cf. Herodotus 7.27-30, 7.38-40). After pointing out that Pythes was overwhelmed with despair because of these disasters, Plutarch adds: τὸν μὲν γὰρ θάνατον ἐφοβεῖτο, τῷ βίῳ δ' ἤχθετο. With an inversion in the order of the clauses, this sentence might be rendered freely: "For he was 'tired of livin' an' feared of dyin'.'"

Chauncey Edgar Finch

Saint Louis University

Meetings of Classical Interest

The *Illinois Classical Conference* will hold its annual sessions at Alton, Illinois, February 21-23, 1952, according to announcement made by its president, Professor Robert C. Stone, of Wheaton College. The *Conference* operates on a biennial cycle, meeting one year in the southern half of the state, and the other year in the northern half.

The Forty-sixth Annual Meeting of the *Classical Association of New England* will be held at the Phillips Exeter Academy, Exeter, New Hampshire, March 21 and 22, 1952. Detailed program and other information may be obtained from the Secretary-Treasurer, Professor F. Stuart Crawford, Boston University, Boston 15, Massachusetts.

The Forty-eighth Annual Meeting of *The Classical Association of the Middle West and South* will be held on April 17-19, 1952, in Toronto, with headquarters at the Royal York Hotel. The CAMWS, including thirty states and the province of Ontario, is for the first time in its history crossing the border to convene in Canada.

The Fifth Annual *University of Kentucky Foreign Language Conference* will meet at Lexington, April 24-26, 1952, under the joint directorship of professors Jonah W. D. Skiles, ancient languages, Adolph E. Bigge, German, and L. Hobart Ryland, Romance

languages. Professor Louis E. Lord will be the special classics lecturer. The Kentucky Conferences are rapidly assuming a leading place among language assemblies. The Fourth Annual Conference, in 1951, had an attendance of approximately 550 persons, representing thirty-four states and four countries, and twenty-six different languages.

The Twenty-seventh Annual Meeting of the *Mediaeval Academy of America* will be held on April 25-26, 1952, in the building of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Boston.

The *Linguistic Society of America* announces The Linguistic Institute, to be held June 18-August 15, 1952, jointly with Indiana University, at Bloomington, Indiana. Distinguished scholars from America and abroad will offer both elementary and advanced courses in linguistics. Special features will include A Fortnight's Conference of Anthropologists and Linguists, July 21-31; and the Summer Meeting of the Linguistic Society of America, August 1-2.

The *American Classical League* announces its Fifth Annual Latin Institute, to be held at Miami University, Oxford, Ohio, June 19-21, 1952. Professor George A. Land is chairman of the Program Committee.

Interscholastic Latin Contest

The Twenty-fifth Annual Interscholastic Latin Contest, for Jesuit high schools of the Chicago and Missouri provinces (including, roughly, the states between the Adirondacks and the Rockies) was held on December 4, 1951. The winners of the first ten places were announced as follows: *first*, John Heffernan, Saint Ignatius High School, Chicago; *second*, Robert Kannenberg, Saint Ignatius High School, Cleveland; *third*, William T. Whalen, Loyola Academy, Chicago; *fourth*, P. J. McGuire, Loyola Academy, Chicago; *fifth*, Daniel G. Kennealy, Saint Xavier High School, Cincinnati; *sixth*, Richard Marohn, Marquette High School, Milwaukee; *seventh*, Cyril K. Heill, Saint Xavier High School, Cincinnati; *eighth*, Mark A. Crowe, Saint Ignatius High School, Chicago; *ninth*, Richard L. Brennan, Creighton High School, Omaha; *tenth*, Martin O'Keefe, Regis High School, Denver.

Salve, Magister Peritissime!

To the plaudits of his many other friends, THE CLASSICAL BULLETIN joins its own voice in congratulating The Reverend Francis P. Donnelly, S.J., of Fordham University upon his election to honorary membership in the New York Classical Club at its meeting of November 3, 1951, and upon the resolution of congratulation from the executive committee of the Classical Association of the Atlantic States on November 24, 1951—both of which events are re-

ported in *CW* 45 (January 7, 1952) 96. The occasion was Father Donnelly's completion of fifty years of teaching. *Ad multos annos.*

Third Capitoline Contest

Of unique interest is the *Certamen Capitolium III*, announcement of which has been received in the following terms:

INSTITVTVM ROMANIS STVDIIS PROVEHENDIS auspiciis Summo litterarum artiumque apud Italos Curatore et Romanae civitatis Magistro, ad novum prosae Latinae orationis certamen omnes omnium gentium Latini sermonis studiosos homines invitat, sperans fore ut ex nobilissimorum ingeniorum concertatione aliquid emicet, quod Quiritium maiestate facundiaque sit dignum.

Certaminis praemium, quod Vrbs praemium nuncupatur, erit argenteum sigillum, *LVPAM CAPITOLINAM* imitatum, honorificentissimum Romanae civitatis munus, in basi victoris nomen atque annum et diem certaminis praeferens. Huic sigillo Summus litterarum artiumque liberalium Curator quinquaginta denariorum Italicorum milia ex aerario adici iussit.

Ceteri petitores, qui digni habiti sint, laude ornabuntur. Ex iis autem qui victori proximis de agone discesserit, argenteo nummo decorabitur, a civitate Romana item donato, qui in antica parte Capitolii imaginem, in aversa litterati viri nomen atque annum diemque certaminis exhibebit. Huic quoque muneri Summus litterarum artiumque liberalium Curator viginti quinque milia denariorum Italicorum ex aerario iussit addi.

Exitum certaminis a. d. XII Kal. Maias a. MDCCCCLII, die Vrbs natali, in aedibus Capitolinis, Romanae civitatis Magister in oratione, quam de more habiturus est, renuntiabit.

Leges Certaminis

I) Fictis fabellis, commentariolis historicis, disputationibus philologis, denique omni prosae eloquentiae genere certare licet: sed praestantium ingeniorum nova experimenta Capitolinum certamen requirit. Scripta quibus petitores certabunt ne puerorum gymnasiis sint destinata ne mille et quingentis verbis breviora ne prius in lucem edita ne alio praemio ornata neve laude.

II) Quinque libellorum suorum exemplaria vel machinula scriptoria perspicue exarata vel typis excusa et tabellariorum diligentiae commendata mittant scriptores aemuli ad *Istituto di Studi Romani—Ufficio Latino—Piazza dei Cavalieri di Malta, n. 2—Roma* ante Kal. Februarias proximi anni non suo tamen distincta nomine ne in integimento quidem quo conclusa sunt, sed sententia munita quae eadem inscripta sit scidulae obsignatae, nomen domiciliumque scriptoris exhibenti.

III) Quinque viri iudices erunt a Summo litterarum artiumque liberalium Curatore et a civitatis Romanae Magistro et a Praeside Instituti nostri delecti. Hi post iudicium scidulas resignabunt, quae easdem quas scripta probata sententias praeferant. Scripta non probata, si repetita, reddentur; sin minus, una cum scidulis obsignatis tertio exacto mense post iudicium publicatum delebuntur igne.

D. Roma Kal. Sept. a. MDCCCLII ab V. c. MMDCCIII

Quintus Tosatti
Praeses Instituti

Eta Sigma Phi Contests

From *The Nuntius* (26 [November 1951] 2) the following important announcement is excerpted:

1. Seventh Annual Essay Contest

a) Subject: "Socrates' Ideals of Citizenship in Plato's *Crito*."

b) Eligibility: The Contest is open to any undergraduate, enrolled at the time of submission of the paper in a course of Greek or Latin in an approved college or university in the United States or Canada.

c) Identification: Each paper is to be accompanied by an "identification page," available on request from the Chairman of Contests, giving necessary information and including a testimonial from a member of the classics faculty at the contestant's school indicating the contestant's right to partici-

pate and his fair and original preparation of the paper. There is no limit on the number of papers from any one school.

d) Qualifications: All papers must be original. Quotations must be duly credited. Format, mode of citation, and the like must be uniform within the paper. Normal sized type-writer paper must be used, and papers must be typewritten on one side only, in double space. The maximum length is 2,250 words.

e) Date: Papers must bear a postmark not later than March 15, 1952, and must be mailed directly to the Chairman of Contests.

f) Decision: Decision as to excellence will be made by a Board of Judges, who will identify the papers by code designation only. In its full award, the Contest will be dependent on a minimum of fifteen entries from fifteen different institutions.

g) Prizes: First, \$50.00; second, \$35.00; third, \$25.00; fourth, \$17.50; fifth, \$12.50; sixth, \$10.00.

2. Third Annual Greek Translation Contest

a) The Contest is open to any undergraduate, enrolled at the time of participation in a course in Greek in an approved college or university in the United States or Canada. The passage for sight translation from Greek will be chosen with an eye to students in the second year of the language or above. The Contest will be held simultaneously in the participating schools on March 15, 1952, for two hours. The Contest, in its full award, will be dependent on a minimum of fifteen entries from fifteen different institutions. Decision as to excellence will be made by a Board of Judges, who will identify the papers by code designation only.

b) Notification of a desire to participate must be sent in writing, not later than March 1, 1952, to the Chairman of Contests. Prizes will be offered as in the Seventh Annual Essay Contest, except that any participant placing in both Contests will receive a third award equal to the one he gains in the Third Annual Greek Translation Contest. Papers submitted must be postmarked not later than March 31, 1952, and must be mailed directly to the Chairman of Contests.

3. Second Satterfield Latin Version Contest

a) The Contest is open to any undergraduate, enrolled at the time of participation in a course of Greek or Latin in an approved college or university in the United States or Canada. It will consist of an original English version of a passage to be supplied on request by the Chairman of Contests. Decision as to excellence will be made by a Board of Judges, who will identify the papers by code designation only.

b) Notification of a desire to participate must be sent in writing, not later than March 1, 1952, to the Chairman of Contests. A prize of \$25.00 will be awarded to the writer of the best paper. Entries must be postmarked not later than March 15, 1952, and must be mailed directly to the Chairman of Contests: W. C. Korfmaier, Chairman of Contests, Eta Sigma Phi, Saint Louis University, 3650 Lindell Boulevard, Saint Louis 8, Missouri.

Latin Epitaphs at Cape Girardeau

In the cemetery of historic Cape Girardeau, Missouri, beneath slabs of stone once carved with Latin inscriptions, lie buried the founder of the city, Don Louis Lorimier, and his wife Charlotte. Though the inscriptions are now completely illegible¹ they have been recorded elsewhere and form an interesting part of the considerable store of original American *carmina epigraphica*.

As Miss Clara E. Krueger of Cape Girardeau indicated to me—and I am indebted to her both for inspiration and for much of the material of this note—the historian Louis Houck preserves the text of Madame Lorimier's inscription² (in which, it will be noted, occur various misspellings presumably attributable to Houck):³

To the Memory
of
Charlotte P. B. Lorimier,

consort of Major L. Lorimier, who departed this life on the 23rd day of March, 1808, aged 50 years and 2 months, leaving 4 sons and 2 daughters.

Vixit, Chaoniae praeses dignissima gentis;
Et decus indigenum quam laps <lapis> iste tegit;
Illa bonum didicit <didicit> natura *** magistra,
Et, duce natura, sponte secuta bonum est;
Talis honos memorum <memorum>, nulla <nullo>
cultore, quotannis
Maturat fructus nitis <mitis> oliva suao <suos>.

Several points deserve comment. The unexpected *Chaoniae* in line 1 of the Latin is probably to be explained (as Houck intimates⁴) as the Latin word most nearly resembling in sound the tribe name "Shawnee" ("Shawano"), Madame Lorimier having been half-Shawnee. In line 3 a single word is noted by Houck as being obliterated; possibly something like *instructa* may have stood there. Finally the last couplet must be understood as pointing up, by a parallel from nature (which of course looms large in an epitaph for a person of Indian blood), the *sponte* of line 4, although *talis* of line 5 is somewhat freely used.

Miss Krueger has also forwarded the inscription originally standing on Major Lorimier's tomb. One-third as long as his wife's epitaph it resembles in phrase and sentiment scores of early Christian Latin inscriptions:

To the Memory
of
Major Louis Lorimier,

a native of Canada and first settler of the post of Cape Girardeau, under the Government of Spain, who departed this life the 26th day of June, 1812.

Ossa habeant pacem tumulo cineresque sepulti;
Immortali animae luceat alma dies.

The author of the inscriptions remains unknown, but that he was a man of parts is certain. Miss Krueger writes that Lorimier's secretary, Bartholomew Cousins, well-versed in languages, may have been responsible. Whatever the truth of the matter, a corner of Missouri of the early nineteenth century preserves an example of what has lamentably almost ceased to be written, the Latin epitaph.

Leo Max Kaiser

Saint Louis, Missouri

NOTES

1 The Cape Girardeau Chapter of the Missouri Historical Society proposes to place granite slabs with the inscriptions newly carved over the graves. 2 Louis Houck, *A History of Missouri* (Chicago 1908) II. 179, note 21. 3 Corrected readings (mostly by Miss Krueger) occur in parentheses. Houck does not indent the second line of the couplets. 4 *Op. cit.*, II. 170, note 9.

Book Reviews

Wilhelm Schmid, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur I, V: Die griechische Literatur zur Zeit der attischen Hegemonie nach dem Eingreifen der Sophistik*. Munich, Otto Harrassowitz, 1948. Pp. viii, 377.

This excellent volume of Müller's *Handbuch* fills up one of the last major gaps in the literary series of this established study (cf. *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, appendix 2), for with the exception of 14 pages of text it is exclusively devoted to Thucydides (pp. 3-223) and Democritus (pp. 236-349). This review will concern itself only with the former

section. It extensively treats all facets of the historian and his work, ranging from the facts of his life to his influence in later ages. Because of the war, the author was unable to use such recent and important books as those by Finley (1942) and Gomme (1945), to say nothing of articles such as those by Finley in *HSCP* (1938-40). However, he makes ample use of the numerous German books and dissertations of the 1930's, which as a group constituted something of a renaissance in Thucydidean studies.

Perhaps the sections of most general interest are those entitled "Elemente der Geschichte" and "Thukydides' kriegs-politische Gesamtanschauung." Therein the sophistic basis of Thucydides' philosophy of history is well demonstrated by constant reference to the text of the history. At the center of his thought is the contemporary "liberal" doctrine of human *φύσις*, with its unflagging drive both for personal freedom and the domination of others. Other major factors in the equation of human activity are the individual's *γνώμη*, the state's *νόμος*, and the incalculable whimsies of *τύχη*. In a world of potential chaos and frequent *στάσις*, an existence wherein the acquisition and wielding of power is the ultimate goal, Periclean Athens is depicted as having the ideal balance of forces for the advancement of the individual and the collective welfare.

Few are the classical writers whose significance for our own times is as patent as that of Thucydides, and the current debate on the future course of American foreign policy gives emphasis to this fact. I believe the policies advocated by George F. Kennan in his recent book (*American Diplomacy 1900-1950 and the Challenge of Soviet Power* [Chicago, 1951]) contain much that is Thucydidean in outlook, and it is this very element of almost exclusive concern for *Machtpolitik* which has drawn the heaviest fire from the critics of Kennan's thesis (cf. *SatRevLit*, Sept. 29, 1951).

The preface of the book has a note of pathos and weariness, for the author was burdened not only by the obvious difficulties of pursuing his work during wartime, but also by advanced age and failing eyesight. He was in his ninety-second year at the completion of this arduous, yet most successful task.

Kevin Herbert

Marquette University

John J. O'Meara, *St. Augustine, Against the Academics* (*Ancient Christian Writers*, Volume 12). Westminster, Maryland, The Newman Press, 1950. Pp. vi, 213. \$3.00.

This work, refuting the doctrine of the Academics that nothing can be held with certainty, is very apropos to the present time, when the world is filled with doubts and confusion. Mr. O'Meara has produced a very excellent and readable translation of the delightful little dialogue of Saint Augustine. In a rather lengthy introduction, he discusses briefly the problems of this and the other dialogues of Cassiciacum, devotes a few pages to the life of Augustine, gives a brief biography of the interlocutors—Alypius, his ardent friend and confidant, Licentius and Trygetius, his devoted pupils, Navigius, his brother, and Romanianus, to whom the *Contra Academicos* is addressed.

Mr. O'Meara points out that Augustine drew upon Cicero's *Academica* for his version of the teaching of the New Academy as well as for his refutation of the same, and that because Augustine had formerly upheld the Academics, upon his acceptance of Christianity, he immediately refuted its arguments—in the *Contra Academicos*. The significance of the work is due to the fact that, because it is written as a personal experience, it gives irrefutable evidence as to whether or not Augustine in 386 attached any importance to Neo-Platonism as compared with Christianity, and that it shows who the Neo-Platonists were whose writings were partly instrumental in his conversion—two widely discussed questions. The final section of the introduction deals with the arguments *pro* and *con* for the historicity of the dialogue of Cassiciacum.

The notes are abundant, explanatory, and very helpful. The index is quite complete. The translation is generally clear and attractively written. An unusual but charming expression, which occurs several times, is "let you," as "let you speak, then." "Let you . . . demonstrate to me that I do not know these things." A typographical error is found on page 124, where the second to last line should be last. The work is a valuable contribution to Patristic literature.

Sister Mary Nerinckx Blincoe, S.L.

Loretto Heights College,
Loretto, Colorado

Five Modern Library Translations: Andrew Lang, Walter Leaf, and Ernest Meyers, with an Introduction by Gilbert Highet, *The Iliad of Homer, Translated*. Pp. xvi, 464. S. H. Butcher and A. Lang, with an introduction by Gilbert Highet, *The Odyssey of Homer, Translated*. Pp. xvi, 383. J. W. Mackail, with an Introduction by William C. McDermott, *Virgil's Works, The Aeneid, Eclogues, Georgics, Translated*. Pp. xxvi, 352. John H. Finley, Jr., with an Introduction, *The Complete Writings of Thucydides: The Peloponnesian War—the Cawley Translation*. Pp. xxi, 516. Whitney J. Oates and Eugene O'Neill, Jr., with Introductions, *Seven Famous Greek Plays*. Pp. xxv, 446. New York, Random House (*The Modern Library*), 1950-1951. Each volume, \$0.65.

A new bid for the college trade in low-priced copies of literary masterpieces appears in *The Modern Library College Editions*. Moving rapidly, Random House has already issued over fifty volumes, including the five classical ones that are listed above. The translations chosen, mostly already well-known to readers of *THE CLASSICAL BULLETIN*, are the same ones that are available in the bound volumes of *The Modern Library*. (The *College Editions* have stiff paper covers.) But the volume of plays is new and supersedes Professor Landis's slimmer selection, dating from 1929, of four Greek plays for the regular series of *The Modern Library*. Each volume has a new introduction and a page or more of bibliography for students. One more thing might have been done: glossaries of the proper names might have been furnished. Oates and O'Neill have such a glossary for the seven plays, but the other volumes do not have any "back of the book." Many a professor will ruefully testify to the hopeless floundering of the undergraduates in the welter of proper names. "Who was Marathon?" "Which side was Pericles on?" "The Dioscuri were the brothers of Helen. Two of them were Agamemnon and Sellar." *Fiat lux*; let's have a glossary, and quickly!

In about ten pages Gilbert Highet has written an informative introduction to Homer. He comments on the Homeric world, and briefly on the origin, authorship, and style of the poems. The same introduction serves for the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* except for the separate synopses of the two epics.

Nearly twice as long is the introduction to Vergil by Professor William C. McDermott. This ampler space permits a fairly detailed account of the poet's life, some discussion of each of his writings, and even a couple of paragraphs on his influence. A map, such as the usual map of Aeneas' wanderings, is a desideratum.

Meaty and brilliantly analytical is the new introduction to Thucydides by John H. Finley, Jr.; and the frontispiece map of Greece, showing the alignment of states siding with Athens or Sparta in the Peloponnesian War, helps to get the volume off to a good start.

The seven plays, two by each of the tragedians and one by Aristophanes, are extracted by Oates and O'Neill from their *Complete Greek Drama* (Random House, 1938); and the introduction is condensed from the same source. Furthermore, each play is accompanied by a short and good introduction. The plays and translators are as follows: *Prometheus Vincetus* (P. E. More), *Agamemnon* (Morshead), *Oedipus Rex* and *Antigone* (Jebb), *Alecestis* (Richard Aldington), *Medea* (E. P. Coleridge), and *Ranæ* (Gilbert Murray). Too much prose, we fear, since only Morshead and Murray give verse translations—though More and Aldington use verse for the choruses and other songs. The rival anthology of six plays by C. A. Robinson, Jr., in the *Rinehart Editions*, uses verse translations throughout, except for the *Lysistrata*.

Our generation is getting the ancient classics in translations, when it gets them at all, and the demand among students is for inexpensive editions. Plato's *Dialogi* in a pocket-book size and price has sold nearly 150,000 copies. Cheers for the publishers! Welcome Penguin! On Rinehart! Up Modern!

Clarence A. Forbes

The Ohio State University

Irene J. Crabb and C. Russell Small, *Rome, a World Power* (*Second Year Course*). Chicago, Lyons and Carnahan, 1951. Pp. 640, xxiv. \$3.20.

This attractive volume wisely opens with a brief review of the basic facts of *Living with the Romans*, the first book in a new series of Latin texts. The work of this second book is divided into three parts: Part I, Plautus's *Aulularia* (adapted); Part II, seventeen adventures from Vergil's *Aeneis* (Books 1-12) in simplified prose; Part III, selections from each of the seven books of Caesar. Well-chosen selections from these three writers have been liberally supplemented by readings in English to supply background material

for each section. The preface declares (p. iii): "It is the conviction of the authors of this book that more emphasis should be placed on the fact that the civilization of the Romans has contributed something to the ages. The Romans should be presented not as marching legions, but as people who opened up roads of civilization to less civilized countries and brought law and order to those countries where confusion and tyranny formerly reigned." The vocabulary, containing the words used in the lists of the College Entrance Board and the New York State Syllabus, is presented in such a way that first-year words are reviewed, and any new words follow the section in which they first occur. Frequent articles on "Latin, Source of English Words," should contribute to the intelligent improvement of English vocabulary. Numerous illustrations, many of them in color, truly illuminate the text. Parts I-II carry the grammar, explained as the principle occurs, under the heading, "How Words Work," and concisely stated for memorizing in each case as "Important Tool." The brief section (thirteen pages), "English into Latin Exercises," is based on the Vergil stories.

Surely the aims of the authors have been realized by the wealth of material in Latin and English, the greatest question being that of choice by the individual instructor to meet local requirements. Teachers wishing a change of scenery or looking for a text to meet "new educational trends" should examine this interesting offering.

Ruth F. Joedicke

Mary Institute,
Clayton, Missouri

Mason Hammond, *City-State and World State: In Greek and Roman Political Theory until Augustus*. Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1951. Pp. x, 217. \$4.00.

Contemporary society, more national- and international-government conscious than it has been for many generations, will welcome Mr. Hammond's study, the substance of which, he says (p. viii), originally "was delivered as six lectures under the auspices of the Lowell Institute of Boston, Mass., in the spring of 1948." The text proper concludes at p. 165; the remainder (pp. 167-217) is given over to Notes, a Selective Bibliography (by chapters), and an Index.

Of chapters themselves there are twelve, surveying Greek political thought from before Plato and through the age of the Hellenistic monarchies (1-4); and then turning to Rome, where chapters on the Roman constitution (5-6) lead to a discussion of Cicero's career and political thinking (7-10); and finally to "Cicero and Augustus: Principate and Restored Republic" (11) and "Conclusion" (12).

For Greek political theorists, Mr. Hammond relies heavily on Plato and Aristotle, as would be expected; at Rome he finds only three who "can seriously be regarded as political theorists, and not merely political thinkers" (p. 5), Polybius, Cicero, and Saint Augustine. Very profitable is the author's interpretation of both political theory and political practice, under Roman influence as well as under Greek, in the frame of ancient experience of the three major forms of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. Though Plato had theorized on a perfect state, yet the "best that could be achieved in this faulty world of material things was a second-best constitution equipped with an elaborate code of laws" (p. 18), as set forth in his *Leges*. However, Aristotle's constitution, in theory, "is less aristocratic and represents . . . a middle-class and democratic compromise between the three pure types" (p. 23).

Neither the Hellenistic monarchies, Mr. Hammond believes (chapter 4), nor Augustus and his associates (chapter 11), were able to work out an adequate political theory for the practical administrative situations in which they found themselves. Ancient political theory, Mr. Hammond contends (p. 165), failed, because it could not advance beyond the city-state concept; modern political theory, looking to "one world" ideas, will likewise fail, he believes, unless it can look beyond the national concept.

A book of this type necessarily impinges upon much that is controversial. Not all will accept the apparent directness and simplicity of Mr. Hammond's interpretation of classical political theory; some may dissent from the statement (p. 3) that "Cicero and Vergil constitute the core of Rome's contribution to the culture of Western Europe;" many that admire and esteem Cicero will be pleased, however, at the generally cordial and laudatory treatment Cicero the statesman and theorist receives. Most will agree that the book is most timely and most useful.

William Charles Korfmacher

Saint Louis University

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